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Eduardo C. B. Bittar, Sao Paulo/ Brazil
 
 
Democracy and Social Utopias: A Study about Albrecht Wellmer and Axel 
Honneth 
 
Abstract: This work intends to analysis the philosophy of history and to discuss the consequences of this 
death to the Critical Theory. The concept of reason and the devices of democracy and human rights are 
discussed in a revision of the historical debate about the end of history operates the life in the interior of 
the modern society, especially about the intellectual condition at the information society. 
Keywords: Democracy - Modern reason - Social utopias – Critical Theory – Axel Honneth. 
 
I. About history and theory fallibility 
The human worldliness is a graveyard of injustices; the history gathers unburied corpses, mortal 
remains and the lethal doses of human reality. Hence, if we can only extract potentials of historic 
importance from the emancipatory theories and exemplary experience, we also must evaluate if 
these  theories  provide  the  correct  and  appropriate  subsidy  for  these  changes.  To  overcome, 
transcend or transgress this state seems to be a human desire since long ages and an intention of 
all  behaviour  orientation  systems,  from  the  religious  to  the  morals,  from  politicians  to 
philosophers. Philosophical systems are not, therefore, the only ones that are motivate by the 
impulse of reality transformation from an ideal. Modernity has built its own ideals, and many of 
them are the possible horizon of the thinking in contrast with the state of affairs. Anyway, the 
intention to overcome the state of affairs answers to a fair pulsing of life and  self-overcoming, in 
human condition, that express a transformer desire that also reveals a noble feeling. But, this 
pulsing has to be evaluated also by its unreality. 
The worldliness experience involves, in the acceptance of fallibility, the recognition of our 
poorness condition. If we can demand too much from the thinking, we cannot demand too much 
from the others, and from the complexity that it is extracted from the socialization processes. The 
otherness, the regulation of social life, the complexity of factors living in the contemporary social 
atmosphere create storms in a way that block a clear vision of the intact enlightenment horizon. 
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When the Social Theory and the Criticism of Law cast the eyes over their research object, they 
must admit that life in society cannot be made by mathematics, that is why the theory is fallible 
in face of reality; all theoretical must recognize that the theory is also expression of subjectivity 
and, therefore, an expression of powerlessness, incapacity, disability, deviation, which results 
from the rational subject’s own history.  
If  philosophical  utopias  feed  real  transformations,  it  is  also  true  that  the  philosophical 
utopias are formed from self-inoculated truth. At this point, the philosophy fallibility must be 
recognized, and it is a necessary recognition of a partial castration, that does not harm the broader 
role that the philosophical reason performs in the social life. It should not be an invitation to 
inertia, instead it must be seen as narcissistic self-restriction to the hypertrophic claims, which are 
the  birthplace  of  personalism  in  the  political  philosophy,  and  therefore,  walk  in  the  way  of 
justification of concrete and heroic expressions of the one-person dictatorship and the totalitarian 
regimes.  The  world  will  not  be  shaped  into  our  own  image  and  similarity,  and  will  not  be 
converted into the narcissistic mirror of itself, even depressing the theory and even that it means a 
lethal  nib  to  the  constitution  form  of  the  modern  Cartesian  Subject  (Sc),  and  to  the 
anthropocentrism from the beginning of modern life.  
Therefore, it must be diagnosed that the transformative revolutionary ways are exhausted. In 
fact, from the present time diagnosis it must be capable to identify, as a philosophical task, the 
serious politician deficit of the big cotemporary democracies. The month of May of 1968 already 
meant  a  historic  sign  of  the  citizen  alteration  in  the  history,  no  more  the  working  class  in 
evidence, but the student movement, and the several identity movements instead. Nowadays, it 
can be computed: unorganized workers, political apathy, trade union bureaucracy, partisanship of 
State, rising of the working  class as consumers, demobilization of student  movement,  social 
disinterest of elections, elitism of the democratic debate, promiscuity between the private interest 
and state interest; among other factors that create the utopian exhaustion sensation in the social 
atmosphere. The individualism only intensifies this sensation of amorphous distension of social 
life.
1 The today conclusions are the same of the 1920 decade of the 20
th century, in which birth 
and motivation were given to the birth of the so called first generation of Frankfurt School. 
 
                                                           
1“Allí donde la sociedad civil ´se despliega con toda su eficacia y sin estorbos´, ya no hay ligadura comunal que 
valga, ya no hay preocupación alguna por el bien común, ya no hay escrúpulos morales que pudiesen poner coto a la 
destrucción social, cuyas víctimas son los perdedores en esa competición universal por los bienes materiales, por el 
poder, por el dinero y por la felicidad” (Albrecht Wellmer, Finales de partida: la modernidad irreconciliable, 1996, 
47-48). 3 
II. To think under the shadow of the Berlin Wall 
When thinking under the shadow of the Berlin Wall, it is important to consider the Wall in fact, 
to  be  taken  into  account  when  calculating  the  politic  risks  of  contemporary  utopian  social 
projects. It is impossible to come back and collect every piece of the Berlin Wall to construct it 
again. In The post-modern political condition, by Agnes Heller and Ferenc Féher, is stated that: 
“Any type of redemptive politic is incompatible with the post-modern political condition”.
2  
In these times, it is symptomatic that the anarchist-libertarian of May 1968 Daniel Cohn-
Bendit, in a current interview affirms that: “In 1968, we wanted the transformation of society by 
revolutionary process, but this is only possible inside the democratic institutions”. Right after he 
declares: “Forget 1968!”, hailed in 27
th August of  2010, in Porto Alegre, Brazil. The same 
question  had  been  discussed  with  Professor  Dr.  Axel  Honneth,  in  the  4
th  International 
Symposium on Justice, “Justice and Recognition: in Honor of Axel Honneth”, In September 29- 
October  1,  2009,  in  Porto  Alegre  (PUC-RS),  Brazil,  with  the  same  conclusions.  The  social 
depression and the sensation of bankrupt of criticism are deeply associated to this condition in 
which reigns the impotence of transformation.
3 There are old, medieval, modern utopias, being 
that the death of the search for a universal social utopia, define the social matter and post-modern 
philosophy, as scenario of reassessment and imagery stagnation, in the critical self -reflection 
depths about modern life.  
There it is implicated the discussion about the death of the western reason, after A dorno. In 
his book of 1985,  About the dialectic between modernity and postmodernity (Zur dialektik von 
Moderne und Postmoderne), Albrecht Wellmer affirms that: “...trata de articularse la conciencia 
de hallarse en el umbral de una época cuyos contornos son aún confusos, poco claros y ambiguos, 
pero cuya experiencia central, sin embargo – la muerte de la razón – parece apuntar al final 
definitivo de un proyecto historico: el proyecto de la modernidad, el proyecto de la Ilustración 
europea, o incluso, por último, el proyecto de la civilización grecoocidental”.
4  
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wanted to get together and speak the way they wanted, and they wanted to get free from the primitive ideological 
indoctrination and from hypocrisy. They yearn something that could be better described as ´a socialism with human 
face´. Perhaps this opinion deserves a second chance” (Slavoj Zizek, Pós-muro, in Piauí, n. 40, Jan. 2010, 47). 
4Albrecht Wellmer, Sobre la dialéctica de modernidad y postmodernidad: la crítica de la razón después de Adorno, 
2. ed., 2004, 49. 4 
III. The risks of radicalization of modernity  
However, the utopias are still representing a key role of social renewal, for the historic scenarios 
tend to purify themselves; if they are not modified by the action of men, they are modified by the 
ruthless nature of history; the history here is more than the history of men, and also more than the 
concept we assign to it. Therefore, the history must have a new sense, and that means the attempt 
for new social utopias. The revolutionary utopias are infected by the subject which they intent to 
overcome.  That  is  the  reason  why  modernity  creates  nameless  human  catastrophes  as  the 
Holocaust. In The global crisis of civilization: the future challenges, in the thoughts of Agnes 
Heller, the following affirmation: “The totalitarianism was – or is – one among them Born in 
Europe, it is the intellectual ugly child of modernity, but it is quite modern”.
5 In the same idea of 
analysis,  considering  the  20
th  century  balance,  in  the  chapter  The  meaning  of  the  civilizing 
process, of the book Modernity and holocaust, the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman affirms that: 
“The modern civilization was not the sufficient condition of the Holocaust; it was, however, with 
no doubts, its necessary condition. Without it, the Holocaust would be unthinkable. It was the 
rational world of the modern society that turned the Holocaust possible”.
6 
Therefore,  the  radicalization  of  modernity  is  in  risk  to  lead  to  the  maximization  of 
instrumentality. The project of removal or review of modernity must pass through the critics 
sieve of the excess that are inside it, which reveals that the modernity elevated to its maximum 
power leads the humanity to self-destruction, because along with its light side, there is the dark 
side. The modern life has its paradoxes, those indicated by Adorno and Horkheimer, in Dialectic 
of Enlightenment, however, these paradoxes must be mitigated, in favour of acceptance of a 
convenience possibility  between liberty  and equality. Therefore, it is  not  a matter to  oppose 
Locke to Marx, nor oppose Smith to Lenin, instead it is a matter of thinking the continuing and 
current challenges of modern life, in its current stage. And that, especially because the modern 
life implies an amount of irreversible needs, which cannot have its end declared, like in the 
threshold of its appearance, and essentially, right after the French Revolution.  
The  radicalized  modernity  is  not  a  synonymous  of  liberty  or  equality.  That  is  why  the 
revolutionary attempt to free modernity from the instrumental reason can, itself, represent a kind 
of  instrumentalization.  The  liberal  revolutions  are  forms  of  this  process  performance,  and 
establish  the  completion  of  modern  life  trapped  by  the  technique  and  encapsulated  by  the 
                                                           
5Agnes Heller, Uma crise global da civilização, in: A crise dos paradigmas em ciências sociais e os desafios para o 
século XXI, 1999, 20. 
6Zygmunt Bauman, Modernidade e holocausto, 1998, 32. 5 
alienating  power.  Therefore,  the  hidden  face  of  modernity  prevents  the  desire  for  more 
modernization. Despite that modernity is not in the end, and despite that modernity cannot be 
surpassed but by its own means, and in its interior, the dialectic vision must prevent the theory to 
be rescued from the action related to the performance of history emancipation. These are some 
problems which a contemporary theory of transition cannot ignore, and of which must be taken 
into account, if intended to propose the termination of class oppression. 
When visiting, historically, this theme, it is noticeable that there are serious issues poured in 
the discussion about modern rationality concerned, becoming, therefore, appropriate to review its 
dictates and formats. This is because the modern reason was made of excess and that history 
needs to be surpassed. The intention of omnipotence of the modern reason must be reviewed to 
be criticized and surpassed. Many of the modern utopias were constituted from these rational 
intentions, and a clear example can be collected in the libertarian ideals whose excesses are 
clearly motivated by the modern rational idealism. The incalculably of all modern rational project 
is the possibility to cross with the other, this complementary-opposite-different-human disturbing 
the accommodation of rational purposes, between the immediate action and the expected results. 
“We need to evaluate the evidence that the civilizing process is, among other things, a process of 
despoiling  the  moral  evaluation  of  the  use  and  exhibition  of  violence  and  emancipate  the 
yearning of rationality of the interference of ethical standards and moral inhibition”.
7 Therefore, 
the abuses of the modern social planning are strictly linked with the unpredictability or denial of 
the other’s political place. 
The  matter  is  the  limit  of  reason,  and  therefore,  the  limit  of  science,  which  cannot  be 
previewed,  and  hence,  despite  of  rationally  anticipate,  it  is  never  capable  to  control  the 
consequences and the historic results. So there is a perspective hermeneutic opacity of the science 
that prevents from seeing ahead. When there is an intention to describe the plotting of the desired, 
an activity of remote and unreachable possibility, there is a mistake. Every architect makes a 
mistake when dimensioning the plant and the real building. Then we have the limitation of which 
the social sciences are vulnerable, after the diseased philosophy of history. When studying the 
totalitarian reason, Albrecht Wellmer, citing Frederic Jameson, affirms that: “Frederic Jameson 
ve en esa renuncia postmoderna a la violencia de una razón totalizadora la oportunidad de un 
nuevo concepto de totalidad por así decir dialógico, postmoderno”.
8  
                                                           
7Zygmunt Bauman, Modernidade e holocausto, 1998, 48. 
8Albrecht Wellmer, Sobre la dialéctica de modernidad y postmodernidad: la crítica de la razón después de Adorno, 6 
Therefore, the current exercise of critical reflection about the modernity does not involves 
the resuscitation of these ‘dead-forms’, but the construction of new forms historically situated 
and relevant of petition for emancipation and justice. Our exercise is to look forward, in present 
conditions, considering the trail of men and women that made mistakes in the past, and, hence, 
thinking about the balance of history without idealization content. That means to answer to a 
necessary and significant post-modern impulse, reconsidering the guiding and misguiding of the 
reason.
9 
 
IV. The terms of the democracy: liberty, equality and recognition. 
That is why, in the scenario of modernity crises, it is difficult to glimpse a social utopia that fills 
all the horizon of the social movements sense. The concussions suffered in the enlightenment 
project were sufficient to imitate its capability to say universal truths. However, this should not 
mean  a  complete  abandonment  of  the  democratic  universalism,  political  balance  factor  that 
remains, and much less the autonomy of the subject from the emancipator force in which the 
theory has  to  perform  in the vanguard of the  understanding horizons  of social  life.
10  In  this 
scenario, the fragmentation of the utopias is a finding of clear sense, which does not implies 
abandonment, but review, reconsideration and pluralization instead: “Este final de la utopia no 
representaría  ningún  bloqueo  de  las  energías  utópicas;  más  bien  su  reconfiguración,  su 
transformación y pluralización; pues ninguna vida humana, ninguna pasión humana, ningún amor 
humano serían pensables sin un horizonte utópico”.
11  
Therefore, in the beginning of the 21
st century, and in the middle of a serious and persistent 
economical and financial global crisis, there are other challenges, and any political perspective to 
the modern societies must imply in the acceptance of modernity and its basic arcane of operation. 
In its internal dynamics, dialectics and historic, modernity is a project that cannot be finished. “El 
proyecto de la modernidad es, políticamente hablando, el proyecto de tal reconciliación entre 
libertad negativa y libertad comunal. Contra Marx y Hegel hay que decir que este proyecto es un 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
2. ed., 2004, 52. 
9“Es en el intento de hacer eso donde yo vería un genuino impulso postmoderno hacia la autosuperación de la razón” 
(See Wellmer (Note 8), 106). 
10“Pero eso no significa que tengamos que despedirnos ni del universalismo democrático y su sujeto autónomo, ni 
del proyecto de Marx de una sociedad autónoma, ni de la razón” (See Wellmer (Note 8), 106). 
11Albrecht Wellmer, Finales de partida: la modernidad irreconciliable, 1996, 76. 7 
proyecto sin fin, un proyecto sin soluciones últimas, un proyecto en el que energías utópicas 
siempre nuevas habrán de transformarse en nuevas soluciones concretas”.
12 
In this situation, the liberties are irrepressible, for they are already consolidated, then there is 
the finding of Albrecht Wellmer: “La razón de esa crítica radica en que no es pensable una 
libertad comunal en el mundo moderno que no descanse en la institucionalización de una igual 
libertad negativa para todos”.
13 However, the matter of liberty still can have problems as can be 
seen,  thinking  with  Hegel,  through  Wellmer.  In  his  book  Endspiele:  Die  universöhnliche 
Moderne (1993), in the chapter Negative liberty and communicative liberty, Wellmer affirms 
that:  “Las  teorías  individualistas  de  la  libertad  se  centran  en  torno  al  concepto  de  derechos 
fundamentales; la libertad queda ubicada en los derechos fundamentales de los individuos. Las 
teorías comunalistas de la libertad ponen, en cambio, la libertad en una forma intersubjetiva de 
vida”.
14 Both theoretical extremes of the discussion about the notion of liberty lead to polarities 
and  opposite  social  models:  the  radical  individualism  (Nozick)  and  the  radical  communism 
(Lenin).
15 There must be a time between them that allows equilibrium between the boi ling state 
factors in the modern life. It is based in Hegel that Wellmer will find the possibility to politically 
speak of the modern social organization, without representing a radical break with its principles. 
Hence, he affirms that: “La respuesta de Hegel a la cuestión de cómo es posible la libertad en el 
mundo  moderno  representaría,  por  tanto,  un  intento  de  superar  la  alternativa  política  entre 
individualismo y comunalismo”.
16  
Therefore, the discussion forged by Wellmer, in his recapture of Hegel, indicates the way of 
modern Hegelian from Honneth thought, which conforms in responding this question, giving the 
term  liberty  a  synthesis-meaning  between  these  polarities.  Liberty  is  not  compatible  with 
equality, provided that liberty means reciprocity and recognition. This analysis appears in Justice 
as  institutionalized freedom: a Hegelian perspective, by Honneth: “By mutual  recognition  is 
meant at first, viewed like this, only the reciprocal experience of envisioning oneself confirmed 
                                                           
12See Wellmer (Note 11), 75. 
13See Wellmer (Note 11), 64. 
14See Wellmer (Note 11), 42. 
15“Las comprensiones individualista y comunalista de la libertad de ningún modo aparecen siempre en la filosofía 
política  moderna  como  oposiciones  polares.  Frecuentemente  se  comportan  más  bien  en  términos  de 
complementariedad,  como  ocurre  en  las  teorías  de  Hegel,  Mill  y  Tocqueville.  El  individualismo  radical  y  el 
comunitarismo radical son más bien casos límite; quizá cabría entender a Robert Nozick como un individualista 
radical y a Lenin como un comunalista radical” (See Wellmer (Note 11), 42). 
16See Wellmer (Note 11), 46. 8 
in the wishes and goals of the person opposite to the extent that his or her existence represents a 
condition for the realization of one’s own wishes and goals”.
17  
In  the  critical  balance  about  the  double  legacy  of  modernity,  Honneth  does  not  take  a 
position in the sense of polarization between liberty and equality, as extreme options, but in the 
sense to affirm perspectives of construction among these semantic fields, while minimal terms of 
modern life. Hence, he affirms that: “No modern theory of justice can refrain from grounding its 
legitimacy in the freedom of the individual or the self-actualization of social individuals”.
18 Then 
the role performed by the knowledge reciprocity in the political life in common, in the political 
life that assumes the tensions and differences, and make them possible in the same living space: 
“In this way, Hegel can conclude that individuals only really experience and realize freedom if 
they participate in social institutions that are formed by mutual recognition relationships”.
19 Fair 
is  the  society  in  which,  using  its  individual  liberties,  acting,  the  singulars  perform  equally 
objectives of a common justice. The individual doses, of collectivity, of State and of market, all 
of them must be weighed in this equation. Then the processivity of the democratic game must be 
fitted in a formula adequate to the equilibrium of these tensions: “What we call just in modern 
societies must no longer be simply measured in terms of the power of all members of society 
over  negative  or  reflective  freedoms,  but  instead  must  satisfy  those  measures  processually, 
securing  the  possibilities  of  these  subjects  being  able  to  participate  in  institutions  of 
recognition”.
20  Hence,  the  current  attempts  of  political  life  can  turn  around  an  even  bigger 
predisposition in social life, when endeavour to: solidarity, education, citizenship, democracy, 
equality, liberty.
21  
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17Axel Honneth, Justice as institutionalized freedom. A Hegelian perspective, 2010, 179. 
18See Honneth (Note 17), 172. 
19See Honneth (Note 17), 185. 
20See Honneth (Note 17), 196. 
21See Wellmer (Note 11), 48. 